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SUMMARY
Projections for climate change extend decades into the future, and
usually to the end of this century due to the long-lived nature of
greenhouse gases (GHGs). Predominant normative frameworks for
corporate governance are primarily short-term in nature, creating a
temporal dissonance within the context of corporate governance and
climate change. Adding to this complexity, the energy transition itself
has temporal paradoxes and implications for the global economy – the
transition away from fossil fuels cannot be too sudden and sharp, but
an urgent yet stable, phased transition is required. Statutory inter-
ventions in the UK have imposed on directors the requirement to
consider the long-term profitability of companies. New initiatives,
such as the task force on climate related disclosures (TCFD), the
Enterprise Principles, and the Oxford-Martin Principles, also advo-
cate for directors to consider the risks from climate change, including
emissions scenarios which take into account short-, medium- and
long-term scenarios. It is by using a phased approach to climate risk
that a smoothing of this temporal dissonance between corporate
governance and climate change can be initiated by businesses.
While many of these new governance initiatives do not yet provide
the requisite level of specificity to demonstrate how a phased approach
could be adopted by particular companies, the TCFD guidance does
provide some tools which would allow companies to adopt a phased
approach, however the types and levels of detail of these tools should
be increased for a variety of types of industry.
1 INTRODUCTION
Climate change has famously been described as a ‘super
wicked problem’ for policy formation due to the interdepen-
dencies and complexities involved.1 This is partly due to the
temporal dimension of climate change. Cumulative emissions
of GHGs are a ‘stock’ problem, and more emissions over time
exacerbate the impacts. In addition, emissions released today
will only be felt decades into the future, and therefore inter-
generational inequities are involved. These temporal dimen-
sions also have implications for businesses. In the context of
climate change as an economic problem, the goal of climate
policy can be perceived as achieving an ‘efficient’ outcome
with the highest net benefits.2 However calculating near-term
costs with long-term benefits, which may involve non-market
goods, is ‘extremely difficult.’3 As Lazarus notes, time is not
costless in this context,4 and the longer solutions are post-
poned, the worse the impacts will be, and the more difficult,
drastic and costly solutions must become to stay within safe
increases of global temperatures.
Projections for climate change extend decades into the
future, and usually to the end of this century due to the
long-lived nature of GHGs. Climate models usually employ
time scales of 2020, 2050 and 2100. The Paris Agreement sets
global temperature goals of well below 2°C with an aspira-
tional goal of holding increases in temperatures to 1.5°C
above pre-industrial levels.5 However, the Paris Agreement
does not impose time frames in which this temperature goal
should be achieved, only including an aim that Parties should
reach global peaking of GHG emissions ‘as soon as possible’.6
Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) and United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP) are more precise, calculating that in order to reach
the global temperature goals, significant reductions in GHGs
must be achieved by 2030, 2050, and near-zero emissions by
2100.7 A more aggressive timescale for reaching 1.5°C may
be necessary as keeping global temperature goals under 2°C
may no longer be safe. In order to do this, emissions must
peak immediately and reach net zero (including negative
emissions) by 2050.8 Strong engagement with non-state actors
such as companies is key to implementing and increasing the
ambition of nationally determined contributions of states.
Due to the cumulative nature of emissions, near-term choices
will have significant impacts on the scale and intensity of
future emission reductions, but also have cost implications.
As Richardson notes, many dimensions of time are missing
from or marginalized in environmental governance.9 The law
can structure time by creating temporal orderings and thereby
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constructing a social time that can disconnect society from
nature’s timescales.10 The law itself is also subject to structural
forces of inertia and progression, as it seeks both stability and
continuity, but also has the capacity to spur change in
response to shifting social values.11 This is true in the area
of corporate law as well, where directorial norms such as the
business judgment rule and fiduciary duties are traditionally
interpreted (arguably incorrectly) as making it more difficult
to defend near term actions which have long-term benefits,
particularly where costs are involved.12 Predominant norma-
tive frameworks for corporate governance are short-term in
nature, creating a temporal dissonance within the context of
corporate governance and climate change. In this context, the
financial implications of climate risk are one of the most
pervasive misconceptions among corporate boards.13
Companies often misconstrue climate change as a long-term
problem which does not affect short or medium term deci-
sion-making. The exact impacts of climate change are difficult
to estimate, and that complexity, combined with the temporal
dimensions of the problem, lead many organizations to incor-
rectly perceive the issue as not relevant to their present
decision-making choices.14 However, inadequate information
about the risks of climate change to business can lead to
mispricing of assets and misallocation of global capital, and
therefore can present risks to global fiscal stability and market
vulnerability to abrupt asset value corrections.15
Statutory interventions in the UK have imposed on direc-
tors the requirement to consider the long-term profitability of
companies. The UK Corporate Governance Code requires
directors to include a long-term viability statement and the
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) Guidance states this
should align with a company’s investment and planning per-
iod. A paradigm shift is needed for investment in the creation
of value for the long term.16 Adding to this complexity, the
energy transition itself has temporal paradoxes and implica-
tions for the global economy – the transition away from fossil
fuels cannot be too sudden and sharp, but an urgent yet stable,
phased transition is required. New initiatives, such as the
TCFD, and the Enterprise Principles and Oxford-Martin
Principles, advocate for directors to consider the risks from
climate change, including emissions scenarios which take into
account short-, medium- and long-term scenarios. It is by
using a phased approach to climate risk that a smoothing of
this temporal dissonance between corporate governance and
climate change may be initiated by businesses.
This article examines the temporal dissonance between
climate and corporate timeframes, concluding that a phased
approach in the corporate governance context can help to
smooth this temporal dissonance. Existing tools to achieve
this phased smoothing are emerging and should be adopted by
corporate actors. This article assesses these new governance
initiatives using set criteria to examine what these new initia-
tives require of companies, whether they provide tools to
address the temporal dissonance, and whether these tools are
industry specific. Section 2 of this article will assess the tem-
poral frameworks involved in the super wicked problem of
climate change, and section 3 will assess the related normative
frameworks of corporate governance with its preference for
short-termism. Section 4 will analyse the statutory provisions
in Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 and in particular
the emphasis on longer-term decision-making in corporate
governance. Section 5 will provide an assessment of new
regulatory and governance tools, which may aid in smoothing
the temporal dissonance demonstrated in the previous sec-
tions, particularly as highlighted in the recommendations of
the TCFD and emerging legal obligations for companies in
the context of climate change through the Principles on
Climate Obligations of Enterprises and the Oxford-Martin
Principles to Guide Investment Towards a Stable Climate.
Section 6 will conclude with an assessment of selected indus-
try and sector-specific concerns, assess emerging legal frame-
works in the UK and provide recommendations for future
governance approaches.
2 CLIMATE CHANGE: TEMPORAL FRAMEWORKS
Climate change is one of the most pressing yet complex issues of
our time. Its impacts are long-term, potentially irreversible,
global, and stem from seemingly every single facet of economic
activity. The IPCC estimates that GHG emissions have contin-
ued to increase between 1970 and 2010, with larger absolute
increases occurring more recently, between 2000 and 2010.17
The IPCC report is clear that continuing to emit GHGs will
lead to further warming which in turn will lead to long-lasting
and potentially irreversible changes to the climate system.18
They note that these changes will lead to ‘severe, pervasive
and irreversible’19 impacts on ecosystems and people. Due to
inertia in the climate system, action must be taken now to avoid
future damage. The IPCC notes that any delay in concerted
mitigation action beyond 2030 will ‘substantially increase the
challenges’ of meeting the Paris Agreement long-term tempera-
ture goals.20 A more aggressive timescale for reaching 1.5°C is
necessary, with requirements for emissions to peak immediately
and reach net zero (including negative emissions) by 2050.21 At
our current rate of emissions, it is likely that we will reach a
global mean temperature increase of 1.5°C relative to preindus-
trial levels between 2030–2052.22 The Paris Agreement has a
goal of limiting average global temperature increases to ‘well
10 Ibid., at 80–81.
11 Ibid., at 88.
12 Ibid., at 326.
13 ClientEarth, Risky Business: Climate Change and Professional Liability
Risks for Auditors 3 (Dec. 2017).
14 Task Force for Climate Related Disclosures, Final Report ii (June 2017),
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(accessed 8 June 2019).
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and Financial Stability (29 Sept. 2015), https://www.bankofengland.co.
uk/-/media/boe/files/speech/2015/breaking-the-tragedy-of-the-hori
zon-climate-change-and-financial-stability.pdf?la=en&hash=
7C67E785651862457D99511147C7424FF5EA0C1A; (accessed 8 June
2019) TFCD, Final Report 2017 ibid., at 1.
16 Expert Group on Global Climate Change, Principles on Climate Obligations
of Enterprises 22 (Eleven International Publishing 2017), https://climateprin
ciplesforenterprises.org/resources (accessed 8 June 2019).
17 IPCC, supra n. 7, at 4; While the rate of increase in emissions slowed
between 2012–2013, it is too early yet to determine whether this is a
permanent trend; see UNEP, supra n. 7, at xiv.
18 IPCC, supra n. 7, at 8.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., at 24.
21 Reed, supra n. 8.
22 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 1.5°C Special Report,
Summary for Policy Makers, 3 (6 Oct. 2018).
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below 2°C’, with an aspirational goal of limiting the increase to
1.5°C.23 This agreement on temperature goals was partly the
result of a Structured Expert Dialogue held between 2013–2015,
which found that the previous global goal of limiting tempera-
ture increases to 2°C was inadequate to prevent dangerous levels
of climate change impacts globally.24 The IPCC has estimated
that keeping total human-induced warming to less than 2°C
with a probability of over 66% would require that cumulative
carbon dioxide emissions from all anthropogenic sources be
limited to 2,900 GtCO2.
25 By 2011, they estimated that we
had already reached approximately 1,900 GtCO2,
26 leaving us
with a total global carbon budget of approximately 1,000
GtCO2.
The UNEP publishes an annual Emissions Gap Report.
The 2016 report states that, while the Paris Agreement will
slow climate change, it will not do enough or do enough fast
enough.27 The 2018 report states that under the Paris
Agreement, the world is on track for approximately 3.2°C
of warming, which the report states is not sufficient to avert a
climate disaster.28 The report urges immediate and strong
action, particularly from major economies.29 Without such
urgent action, carbon intensive energy infrastructure will be
locked-in, leaving less ‘solution space’ and fewer options for
society in the future, leading to greater reliance on negative
emissions, increased costs of mitigation, and greater risks of
economic disruption.30
Higher global temperature increases above 2°C may put
humanity’s very existence at stake. The IPCC projects that
climate change impacts above 2°C from the middle of the
twenty-first century onward will undermine global food
security and redistribute marine species and biodiversity.31
An increase of 4°C or more would pose ‘large risks to food
security globally’,32 and would lead to substantial species
extinction, global and regional food insecurity and constraints
on human activities.33
A recent World Bank Report, ‘Turn Down the Heat: Why
a 4°C Warmer World Must Be Avoided’, makes stark read-
ing. It notes that present CO2 concentrations are higher than
paleoclimatic and geologic evidence indicates has occurred at
any time in the last fifteen million years.34 It continues,
‘Recent research suggests that large-scale loss of biodiversity
is likely to occur in a 4°C world, with climate change and
high CO2 concentration driving a transition of the Earth’s
ecosystems into a state unknown in human experience.’35 It
warns that the cumulative and interacting effects of such
wide-ranging impacts of climate change are not well under-
stood scientifically, and therefore ‘there is no certainty that
adaptation to a 4°C world is possible.’36 This is because at
certain ecological or climate tipping points, the impacts
become irreversible. Near-term choices on emissions can
lead to what the IPCC refers to as ‘lock-ins or irreversibilities’
in the climate system.37 These events could lead to run-away
climate change.
It is clear that human activities, particularly GHG emis-
sions and deforestation, are key drivers of climate change,
and the impacts are likely to be wide ranging, dispropor-
tionate, and potentially severe, leading us to a global climate
crisis. However, mitigation and substantial cuts in GHGs in
the next few decades could substantially reduce the risks of
climate change.38 Emissions are cumulative, so a certain
degree of warming is already locked into the atmosphere
due to historic emissions, but limiting warming from 2030
and beyond could avert catastrophic climate change. These
mitigation pathways, according to the IPCC, are likely to
limit warming to below 2°C, but would require substantial
emission reductions in the next few decades, a peaking of
emissions by 2020, and ‘near-zero’ emissions of GHGs by
2100.39 These attempts at mitigation would require 40–70%
reductions in GHGs by 2050 in order to establish a stable,
declining trajectory of emissions, in order to reach about 450
to 500 ppms CO2 equivalent by the end of the century.
40
The decline and eventual abolition of fossil fuels would
require large-scale changes to existing energy systems and
land use,41 and therefore companies will be an important
part of the energy transition. This means that corporate
action to reduce emissions will be required in the next few
decades as significant emission reductions are required by
2050. Changing business systems, value chains and strategies
will take time, and to achieve specific reduction targets by
2030 and 2050 requires near term decision-making on tran-
sitioning business in the next two decades. However, cor-
porate boards may be largely ill-equipped to start making
these decisions, partly due to the predominant focus on
short-term profits.
3 NORMATIVE SHORT-TERMISM IN THE UK
The Cadbury Code in 1992 and subsequent initiatives have had a
positive influence on the corporate governance landscape in the
UK and have allowed it to evolve and to respond – sometimes
successfully and some other times less efficiently – to a series of
scandals and corporate failures as well as the challenges that the
modern business community faces. Despite the widespread con-
sensus that the UK has been a pioneer in the area of corporate
governance regulation, there is still a pressing issue of short-
termism, which needs to be addressed, as it has not been properly
resolved. The recent global financial crisis has further highlighted
its importance for the future of corporate governance and financial
regulation in general. The pursuit of short-term goals and gains
has a potentially detrimental effect on the long-term prospects of
companies, and their contributions to climate change.
Concerns about excessive short-termism in boardrooms
and in the overall decision-making process have been
23 UNFCCC, supra n. 5, Art. 4.
24 UNFCCC, ‘Report on the Structured Expert Dialogue on the
2013–2015 Review’, FCCC/SB/2015/INF.1, para. 40.
25 IPCC, supra n. 7, at 10.
26 Ibid.
27 UNEP 2016, supra n. 7, at xi.
28 Ibid., at xi; see also UNEP 2018, supra n. 7, at xvii.
29 Ibid., at xiii and xiv.
30 Ibid., at 9.
31 Ibid., at 14.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., at 18.
34 World Bank Report, Turn Down the Heat: Why a 4°C Warmer World
Must Be Avoided xiv (2012), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/han
dle/10986/11860 (accessed 8 June 2019).
35 Ibid., at xvi.
36 Ibid., at xvii.
37 IPCC, supra n. 7, at 87.
38 Ibid., at 18.
39 Ibid., at 21; see also UNEP 2018, supra n. 7, at xvii.
40 IPCC, supra n. 7, at 21 and 27.
41 Ibid., at 91.
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expressed on several occasions and through different med-
iums. The Kay Review in 2012 expressly mentioned that
‘short-termism is a problem in UK equity markets, and the
principal causes are the decline of trust and the misalignment
of incentives throughout the equity investment chain’.42 In
December 2017 the FRC published its proposals for a revised
UK Corporate Governance Code to reflect the changing
business environment and to help UK companies achieve
the highest levels of governance. The revised Code, in an
attempt to restore the public trust in business and strengthen
the attractiveness of the UK capital market to global investors
in the post-Brexit era, will give emphasis to the importance of
long-term success and sustainability of companies.43
This section will review all the corporate governance
reviews and codes introduced in the UK, with the view to
ascertain whether and to what extent these instruments pro-
moted or facilitated short-termism in the UK corporate gov-
ernance landscape.
In 1992, the first corporate governance report in the UK
was published by the Committee on the Financial Aspects of
Corporate Governance under the Chairmanship of Sir Adrian
Cadbury. The Cadbury Report clearly placed shareholders at
the centre of the corporate governance scene. No other
stakeholders were mentioned in the report and no reference
was made to long-term strategy. At this point, it is useful to
note that the Cadbury Committee was a private-sector initia-
tive, established by non-governmental agencies, such as the
Financial Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange,
and the accountancy profession in the aftermath of the
Maxwell, Polly Peck and the Bank of Credit and
Commerce International scandals and collapses. As such, it
represents an effort to introduce a new, different type of
regulatory approach, lighter, more flexible and voluntary,
but it also reflects an attempt to stave off government inter-
vention in corporate affairs through legislation.44 It advocated
that ‘statutory measures would impose a minimum standard
and there would be a greater risk of boards complying with
the letter, rather than with the spirit, of the regulations’.45
The Greenbury Review in 1995, although set to deal
with the remuneration of directors, remained focused on
the interests of shareholders and did not touch upon the
issue of the short-term/long-term dichotomy.46 The 1998
Hampel Review did not deviate from the previous position
in relation to the focus of directors’ duties (present and
future shareholders) but denounced the exclusive emphasis
on the short-term interests of today’s shareholders in favour
of developing and sustaining strong relationships between
the company’s directors and stakeholders.47 It is worth men-
tioning that this is the first time that the terms ‘stakeholders’
and ‘long-term’ are employed in a corporate governance
document, but there is not much detail as to the interaction
between shareholders’ and stakeholders’ interests and
no discussion about how companies should develop a
long-term perspective in pursuing shareholder value, instead
of a short-term one.
The Combined Code, in its Preamble mentioned that ‘Good
governance should facilitate efficient, effective and entrepreneurial
management that can deliver shareholder value over the longer
term’. In relation to incentives and remuneration, there are refer-
ences made to ‘long-term incentive schemes’, which indicate that
the Committee identified the need for remuneration not to be
excessive, rewards to be phased, not awarded in one large block,
and stock options not to be exercised in under three years.48
These arrangements were clearly intended to link remuneration
with performance and ultimately encourage listed companies to
adopt a long-term strategy rather than a myopic one, focused on
short-term share prices. Neil Cowan, Vice President of the
EuropeanConfederation of Institutes of Internal Auditing, argued
that this represented ‘a welcome restatement of that part of a
board’s prime responsibility for devising a strategy that will ensure
the company’s continued existence’.49
As it will be discussed later, although the idea of using
principles and voluntary compliance was innovative and
seemed ideal to set the tone for all companies, in practice it
soon became apparent that compliance was unsatisfactory.
Managers and directors, instead of using this opportunity to
transform their corporations, engaged in a box-ticking exer-
cise and on several occasions failed to follow the spirit of the
rules.50 In this regard, a voluntary approach may have encour-
aged a move away from measurement and accountability
towards statements of general intent and direction, a move
away from tangible codes to more nebulous principles.51
Just one year after the introduction of the Combined
Code, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England
and Wales published the Turnbull Guidance to Directors on
Certain Aspects of the Combined Code of Corporate
Governance in 1999. Despite the fact that the Guidance
reaffirmed that the shareholder wealth maximization
approach52 remains dominant in the UK, it recognized that
the corporate objective is not simply to maximize shareholder
returns in the short-term, highlighting the need to safeguard
both shareholders’ investment and the assets of the company
against unnecessary risks. Without specifically raising the issue
of short-termism, the Turnbull Guidelines underlined the
42 The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-term Decision Making:
Final Report 9 (July 2012).
43 Financial Reporting Council, Proposed Revisions to the UK Corporate
Governance Code 7 and 13 (Dec. 2017).
44 Ian Jones & Michael Pollitt, Understanding How Issues in Corporate
Governance Develop: Cadbury Report to Higgs Review, 12(2) Corp.
Governance 162, 169 (2004).
45 World Bank Report, supra n. 35, at para. 1.10.
46 ‘Directors Remuneration Report of a Study Group Chaired by Sir
Richard Greenbury’ (1995), paras 4.2 and 6.16.
47 Committee on Corporate Governance Final Report (1998), para.
1.18. Helen Short, Corporate Governance: Cadbury, Greenbury and
Hampel – A Review, 7(1) J. Fin. Reg. & Compl. 57, 58 (1999).
48 Financial Reporting Council, The Combined Code on Corporate
Governance (2003), Principle B3.4, Schedule A2, 3 and 5 and Schedule
B1 and 3.
49 Nelson Cowan, Let the Boardroom Beware, The Times, 28 (4 Sept.
1997).
50 Roger Carr, Adherence to the Spirit, in Financial Reporting Council,
Comply or Explain: 20th Anniversary of the UK Corporate Governance
Code Financial Reporting Council 16 (2012). See also Antoine Faure-
Grimaud, Sridhar Arcot & Valentina Bruno, Corporate Governance in the
UK: Is the Comply-or-Explain Approach Working? (2005), Discussion Paper
081, Corporate Governance at LSE Discussion Paper Series No. 001,
https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/24673/1/dp581_Corporate_Governance_at_
LSE_001.pdf (accessed 8 June 2019).
51 Editorial, Management Today 3 (Sept. 1997).
52 The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales,
International Control Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code (Sept.
1999), para. D.2; Dominic Elliot, Steve Letza, Martina McGuinness &
Clive Smallman, Governance, Control and Operational Risk: The Turnbull
Effect, 2(3) Risk Mgmt. 47, 50 (2000).
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importance of risk management and encouraged companies to
review their risks regularly in response to the changing busi-
ness environment, keep their shareholders informed about
risks and to ensure that prospective returns should justify
foreseeable risks.53
Although the Turnbull Guidance was a step towards the right
direction, it is essential to examine why companies did not
manage to put in place a comprehensive risk management,
monitoring and auditing system and in turn why short-termism
blossomed instead of being suppressed. One of the problems was
that the Guidance took for granted that most companies would
already have the fundamentals of good risk management in place
and that these companies would merely have to formalize
already embedded good practice. Unfortunately, this system
was not adequate for those companies which already had gov-
ernance deficits and were consequently the most likely to
experience a governance breakdown. In other words, the
Guidance, albeit useful for the creation of a governance frame-
work, proved to be inadequate for companies that had weak or
no foundations to build upon.54
Until 1999, all reports, codes and reviews placed share-
holders at the heart of corporate governance as the primary,
and in most cases only, constituent, whose interests directors
should promote. In 2002, the Higgs Report underlined the
obligation of directors to act in the interests of ‘the company’
and to promote its success,55 but it was still too early to talk
about a departure from the shareholder primacy paradigm.56 It
was not until the 2010 version of the UK Corporate
Governance Code that it was expressly stipulated from the
very beginning that ‘the purpose of corporate governance is
to facilitate effective, entrepreneurial and prudent management
that can deliver the long-term success of the company’57 and
‘every company should be headed by an effective board which
is collectively responsible for the long-term success of the
company’.58 The promotion of the long-term success of the
company is once again mentioned with regards to
the performance-related elements of executive directors’
remuneration.59 It is evident that the wording of the Code
and the terminology used has been influenced by the Company
Law Review Steering Group (CLRSG) reports and the
Companies Act 2006. Two years later, in 2012, the Code
included a reference to the delivery of long-term success,
accompanied by a focus on the sustainable success of an entity
over the longer term, as one of the underlying principles of all
good governance.60
The 2016 UK Corporate Governance Code describes the
goal of the company as being the sustainable success of the entity
over the longer term.61 The Code referred to the directors as
being primarily accountable to shareholders,62 but it did recog-
nize that other non-shareholder constituents make contributions
to the company, and that directors were encouraged to recog-
nize these contributions and listen to their views, provided they
are relevant to the overall approach to governance.63 It is hard to
argue that the Code has lost its shareholder-centric character, as
the acknowledgement paid to other constituents, albeit positive,
falls short of making a real contribution towards a change in the
existing corporate culture.
Finally, the Green Paper,64 which deals with the strengthen-
ing of the UK corporate governance framework, touches upon
the issue of long-term pay incentives and how these incentive
plans can be better aligned with the long-term interests of
quoted companies and shareholders. Even though it is difficult
to assert with confidence the link between executive pay and
long-term company performance,65 it is true that the growing
complexity of executive pay packages has contributed to poor
alignment between executives, shareholders and the company.66
This is why there are more and more voices arguing in favour of
the simplification of executive pay packages as well as linking
executive pay to sustainable long-term value creation67 and the
long-term company performance.68
The foregone analysis reveals that there is no compelling evi-
dence found in any of the codes and reports developed in the post-
Cadbury era that expressly supports a short-term approach in the
way that companies are run and operated. It seems that the causes
of short-termism are deeply rooted in the core of widely-held
companies and the very characteristics of the UK corporate gov-
ernance system, which form the basis of its success and prevalence,
are the same ones that allowed short-termism to blossom. More
specifically, the UK system is based on self-regulation, soft-law
rules, broad principles and statements of good practice, which
allow flexibility and voluntary compliance depending on the
structure and the requirements of every company.
However, the same economic reasons that encourage
short-termism will inevitably encourage managers to avoid
substantial compliance with the best practice principles and,
since there is no supervisory body to monitor compliance,
executives’ conduct will be determined by the incentives
offered to them or the direction of the overall market.69 If
53 ICAEW, Internal Control: Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code
(1999), para. 13.
54 Lynn Drennan & Matthias Beck, Corporate Governance: A Mandate for
Risk Management? (2001), www.bolc.co.uk/downloads/CG%20and%
20internal%20controls14941303386403.doc (accessed 8 June 2019).
55 Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-executive Directors 5 and 6
(2003), Principle A1 and A.3.3.
56 John Armour, Simon Deakin & Suzanne J. Konzelmann, Shareholder
Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance, 41(3) Brit. J. Indus.
Rel. 531, 523 (2003).
57 Financial Reporting Council, The UK Corporate Governance Code
(2010), para. 1.
58 Ibid., Principle A1.
59 Ibid., Principle D1.
60 Financial Reporting Council, The UK Corporate Governance Code 1
(2012), Governance and the Code.
61 Financial Reporting Council, The UK Corporate Governance Code
(2016), Principle 1, para. 4.
62 Ibid., at para. 9.
63 Ibid.
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the market is driven by short-termism, it is most likely that
managers and directors will behave accordingly regardless of
what the corporate governance codes stipulate. It seems that
whatever the good intentions, short-term performance con-
tinues to be the priority for many, and long-term perspectives
only for the enlightened few.70 The corporate governance
codes have not been successful in creating a culture that
supports innovative, sustainable long-term business perfor-
mance. Although the Cadbury Report specifically identified
the looseness of accounting standards, the absence of a clear
framework for ensuring that directors kept under review the
controls in their companies, and competitive pressures on
companies and auditors, as some of the factors that caused
governance breakdowns, not much was done in relation to
expanding the concept of managerial accountability or
addressing wider issues of ethics and responsibility in the
boardrooms. We can see a change in the language used by
the codes, but they should have been much more explicit in
highlighting the significance of long-term trust relationships.
Supporting long-term management can be achieved with-
out new regulation if committed long-term investors and
business leaders work together to create high performing
companies and earn returns for investors on a sustainable
basis. It requires raising awareness activities, which will pro-
mote a change in the modus operandi of companies and their
management teams and encourage a different leadership
model. It takes time and commitment to initiate and imple-
ment such change of culture, but the ‘comply or explain’
system allows enough flexibility and breathing space, so it is
a unique opportunity for companies. If ‘comply or explain’
leads to a meaningless box-ticking exercise and ends up
meaning non-compliance, poor explanations and superficial
adherence of minimum standards, then ‘the behaviour of a
limited few has damaged the reputation of many’.71
The UKCorporate Governance Code can only serve as a road
map, but rules and regulations will not work without the right
corporate culture. This is about values. In his Gresham lecture, on
12 May 1998, Sir Adrian Cadbury, looking back on the drafting
of his report, attributed contemporary governance problems to a
decline in the traditional, informal system of corporate govern-
ance in the City: Many new entrants to the City did not share the
values of what they saw as the past. The gap in the framework of
rules, which arose in the much-enlarged City, was that nothing
was put in place of the personal links with the heads of firms.
There was no consistent means of passing on business values to
newcomers and ensuring that they were adhered to.72
4 SECTION 172 CA 2006 AND THE
TRANSITION TO LONG-TERM HORIZONS
As it was discussed in the previous section, the vast majority
of corporate governance reviews that have been developed
since 1992 have assumed and explicitly referred to either
shareholders as owners of the company, and/or placed their
interests at the heart of the company’s operation. Until the
CLRSG in 1999–2001, it had merely been assumed, arguably
incorrectly, that English company law prioritized shareholder
interests above all other constituents, including those of the
environment. This approach can be attributed to a misunder-
standing by the business community of the role that company
law itself had ascribed to shareholders.
The Steering Group took a completely different stand,
acknowledging that stakeholders play a more active role in
corporate governance and attempting to put an end to the
(traditional) agency view of company law that focuses only on
shareholders and ‘ex post director opportunism’. The require-
ment to have regard to the long-term implications of their
decisions in Section 172 Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006) reflects
the enlightened shareholder value (ESV) paradigm and this
provision was included in order to specifically address concerns
that corporate directors were increasingly adopting a short-term
approach in relation to their companies’ operations and strategy.
While the inclusion of this requirement is undoubtedly a posi-
tive development, we need to reflect on its real meaning and its
enforcement in practice, with view to determine whether it has
signalled a transition towards long(er)-term horizons.
Before discussing Section 172, its content and implementa-
tion, it is worth examining the approach taken by both
academics and the judiciary in relation to the issue of corpo-
rate objective and the primacy or not of shareholders.
Law and economics theories view a company as a privately
ordered nexus of contracts, with minimal or no role for state
or regulatory intervention to balance competing interests
within the company. The primary goal of companies should
be transactional cost reduction and increase of profits, and one
of the major normative goals of the law and economics
movement is to increase social welfare through the maximi-
zation of profits.73 It is unclear, however, whether this means
increasing profits only or the value of the company as a
whole.
According to the contractarian approach,74 a company is an
exclusively private organization. Shareholders are seen as the
primary constituent of the company and shareholder wealth
maximization as the most important function of the company.
Contractarians argue that overall societal wealth can be
achieved by providing profitable returns for shareholders.75
However, a heavy reliance on the shareholder wealth max-
imization norm has led to a myopic focus by directors on
short-term profitability to the detriment of the long-term
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value of the company. This short-term mentality restricts the
concept of the modern company as an entity capable of
serving a variety of interests and in effect undermines any
attempt to focus on long-term issues that may affect society
and the company, such as the environment and climate
change.76
These theories have had a strong influence on English
company law, as evidenced by the CLRSG reports that reflect
a rather strong contractarian and largely economic under-
standing of company law.77 The influence is so strong that,
although prior to 2006 common law reserved a large amount
of discretion for directors in the performance of their duties78
and only a slim line of case law dictated that directors owe
duties to shareholders,79 there was a prevailing view that
directors owed duties to the company and by the company,80
the common law meant current and future shareholders. As a
result, a considerable number of theorists shared the view that
the shareholder primacy theory has always been an integral
part of English company law81 without any support from the
judiciary. The common test was that directors owed duties to
the company as an entity or the company ‘as a whole’ and
directors were allowed a large amount of discretion as to
whose interests they choose to promote, provided that their
decisions benefit the company as an entity.82 This inconsis-
tency may simply evidence an unfolding of a historical mis-
understanding of the proper role of shareholders and/or it can
be the result of the English common law’s deference (or
ambivalence) in the area of directors’ duties.83
The absence of clear guidance84 provided in relation to the
corporate objective, coupled with the large amount of discre-
tion afforded to directors,85 created a gap, which was filled by
the shareholder value theory. As Sjåfjell notes, the shareholder
value norm has flourished precisely because company law has
not specified what societal value a company should provide.86
Even though the common law has afforded directors the
flexibility to consider, and even prioritize, environmental or
other concerns over shareholder profits, if that ultimately
benefited the company, this did not happen in practice.
Shareholder primacy may not have been a firm legal mandate
of directors, but shareholders were placed at the centre of the
UK company law and directors continued to focus on share-
holder interests as their primary concern. This may be due to
the influence of corporate codes of conduct, which were
advocating shareholder primacy, as well as market forces
that have created the perception that shareholder primacy is
a legal requirement for directors.87
It soon became apparent that the position of English law on
directors’ duties is not only clothed in ambiguity, but there
was also another misunderstanding. The CLRSG determined
that directors understood that they were expected to adopt a
short-term focus on profits in order to satisfy their share-
holders, but this was not what the law required.88 This failure
by directors to adopt a long-term approach to a company’s
success suggested to the CLRSG that there was a strong case
for making the current law more explicit by providing for a
long-term vision that would necessitate the taking into
account of wider interests.89 The directors would still act for
the benefit of shareholders, while supporting a more ‘inclu-
sive’ way of accomplishing this goal.90 In short, although the
overall objective of the company should be pluralist in ensur-
ing maximum welfare for all, the means of achieving this
should recognize the realities of running a corporate
enterprise.91
The introduction of the Companies Act 2006 signalled a
new era in the area of directors’ duties and the ESV approach
was adopted following a comprehensive review of English
company law. The primary objective of the review and the
reform of the Companies Act was to achieve competitiveness
and the efficient creation of wealth and other benefits from
the corporate enterprise as well as to minimize the negative
impacts of corporate activity on participants and to maximize
welfare more widely.92
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The CLRSG considered two approaches to describe what
the objective of companies should be: the ESV approach,
and the pluralist approach. The pluralist approach was dis-
carded, because the CLRSG considered that it would
distract directors by forcing them to manage competing con-
siderations at the expense of economic growth and interna-
tional competitiveness.93 On the contrary, the ESV approach
was described as the approach currently enshrined in English
law, as this approach appeared to be consistent with the
ultimate objective of companies and thus the best means of
providing for overall prosperity and wealth.94
According to the CLRSG, the ESV ‘sets as its basic goal for
directors the success of the company in the collective best
interests of shareholders. But it also requires them to recog-
nise, as the circumstances require, the company’s need to
foster relationships with its employees, customers and suppli-
ers, its need to maintain its business reputation and its need to
consider the company’s impact on the community and the
working environment’.95 The ESV approach recognizes,
therefore, that a company’s long-term success is dependent
not only upon satisfying shareholder interests, but valuing
relationships with non-shareholder constituents as well.96
A lot of emphasis is placed on whether Section 172 brings
about a radical change as to the constituencies that directors
should pay attention to. Academics are far from reaching con-
sensus as to whether this new legislative approach provides for a
new pluralistic approach to managing companies or whether
Section 172 further entrenches the shareholder value approach.
Directors, when considering the long-term consequences of
their actions, are required to have regard to all the factors listed in
Section 172(1) and take them into consideration before taking any
decision. This intellectual process should take place in the broader
context of determining whether a particular course of action
would be likely to promote the success of the company.97
However, this requirement is only one of several factors men-
tioned in Section 172, which means that directors are expected to
balance all these factors, even if there are possible conflicts
between them.98Directors can take into account non-shareholder
interests when they promote the economic interests of the com-
pany and shareholders.When this is not the case, directors may be
free to disregard non-shareholder interests, and instead pursue
matters that promote the success of the company. For example,
environmental concerns may not be prioritized over shareholder
interests, unless this promotes the success of the company and the
shareholders or increases the long-term profitability of the
company.99 This is a rather challenging balancing exercise, the
outcome of which ultimately depends on each individual direc-
tor’s skills and mindset, considering that no guidance has been
provided to directors, shareholders and the courts on how this
provision should be applied in practice. Judge Pelling QC in
Stimpson v. Southern Landlord Association100 stated that directors
can act in any way they consider, in good faith, to be most likely
to promote the success of the company, but where the company
has mixed objectives, the interests of the members cannot be
ignored. In circumstances of conflict between promoting the
success of the company and benefiting the members, he states
that a balancing exercise will be required.101
In addition, there is no real definition of, or guidance on, what
long-term is. It is a very subjective concept, which cannot be
defined by the legislator and it varies fromone company to another
and from one industry to another. The definition of ‘long-term’
and its incorporation in a company’s business strategy rests upon
the directors and can be influenced by shareholders and
stakeholders.102 If we go back to the CLRSG in 2001, it was
reported that there is a convergence between the interests of
shareholders and the interests of other stakeholders over the issue
of the companies’ long-term focus, with both served best by
companies and directors that take a long-term approach to
success.103 In practice, this convergence between shareholders,
stakeholders and the company is more of an exception rather
than the rule.
The association of success with share prices resulted in share-
holders giving priority to short-term gains and high share prices,
regardless of any long-term consequences and effect on a com-
pany’s sustainability. For instance, short-term investors have little
or no interest in the long-term success of the company whose
shares they so briefly own, but at the same time they are members
of the company, whose interests the directors are required to
serve, sometimes even above those of other stakeholders. The
idea that the management’s primary responsibility is to maximize
long-term shareholder value is widely accepted in principle but
imperfectly implemented in practice. Maximizing long-term
value means that emphasis is given to continuing shareholders
rather than momentum investors and other short-term oriented
market players. To maximize value to continuing shareholders,
directors must develop and effectively execute strategies that
maximize the company’s long-term cash flow potential.104
Expanding on short-term profitability and taking the example
of environmental protection, Section 172 allows the adoption of
a more long-term strategy in relation to climate change. If one
adopts an entity approach to the company, and given that
companies potentially have a perpetual existence, long-term
profitability could potentially extend beyond the lifetimes of
both shareholders and directors. However, the time periods
over which climate change is usually measured and predicted
extend hundreds of years into the future, and it is questionable
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whether directors today will either be able or willing to consider
effects so far removed from the pressure of quarterly profit
reporting.105
As Jackson and Petraki note, managers tend to be less
short-term oriented when they have access to better and more
accurate information regarding trade-offs between short- and
long-term results.106 While linking corporate reporting and
financial performance with environmental and social goals may
be useful, economic incentives, such as shareholder wealth max-
imization, would most likely continue to constitute a significant
barrier to corporate sustainability.107 Instilling a long-term per-
spective in the boardroom will be difficult while short-term
interests remain high on the agenda, but Section 172 must be
seen as a largely normative measure that, when combined with
stakeholder pressure, the prevailing commercial climate, and a
few enlightened shareholders, will encourage a more inclusive
and longer-term view of what constitutes the success of the
company.108 After all, directors are given a great deal of leeway
in performing their duties, as they can basically favour long- and
short-term interests as the occasion calls for.109 Every time the
board is faced with a business decision, it would need to consider
how that would benefit the company and the shareholders in the
long term, and make decisions that are aimed at achieving that
objective. This would not mean that the board must shape
corporate strategy such that a company foregoes all opportunities
to make current profits, but it would mean that realizing on
current profits could not undermine the company’s ability to
generate profits in the future.110
In this legal context, the role of shareholders and institutional
investors is therefore critical. The system of finance capital within
which a company operates can dictate the time periods which
directors both consider to be relevant, and within which they
operate and make decisions. The divestment movement began in
2011 in US Colleges and Universities, and has since then become
a global phenomenon.111 In September 2014, the Rockefeller
Brothers Fund announced its plan to decrease its investment in
fossil fuels, followed by the Melinda and Bill Gates Foundation in
2016. The movement has also reached the United Kingdom and
the EU, with the Church of England announcing divestments
from thermal and coal tar sands, and the Irish Parliament announ-
cing divestment in its holdings of its Strategic Investment Fund
from fossil fuels in 2017. In the context of climate change, the
divestment movement has gained pace and has the ability to put
short-term pressure on some of the dirtiest companies such as coal
and oil companies. While the divestment movement has its
deficiencies, if combined with reinvestment in green finance
initiatives and industries, the divestment and reinvestment move-
ment has the capacity to be a lever of change in the context of
climate change.112
Regulatory changes and initiatives at both international level
and in the EU and UK also mirror this changing perspective of
investors. The UNEP Finance Initiative (UNEP FI) has been
working along with investors for a number of years in the context
of climate change. The Climate Change Advisory Group is made
up of insurance, investment and banking representatives and
develops research, provides technical advice to industry as well
as providing platforms for leadership and exchange of best practice
tools. In 2018 an Investor Agenda for Climate Change was
formed with other agencies which will help long-term investors
with highly diversified portfolios to report low carbon invest-
ments, phase out investments in coal, sign up to initiatives such as
ClimateAction100+, and improve disclosure of climate risks and
opportunities through the TCFD. The UNEP FI is working on a
pilot project with twenty investors adopting the TCFD recom-
mendations by developing scenarios, models, metrics and a risk
assessment tool that will aid investors in assessing climate risk
across their portfolios.113 The UNEP FI Banking Principles,
developed in 2018, are a set of draft principles for sustainable
banking which, among other things, encourages banks to inte-
grate the Paris Agreement framework in to business decisions and
strategies of finance institutions.114 The Guidance recommends
that banks assess where they can have the most significant impacts,
set targets and create consistency between the bank’s value crea-
tion model and the Paris Agreement goals.115 The EU Pensions
Directive requires that pension fund managers assess and include
environmental risk, including climate change,116 and the UK
regulations require that pension fund managers report on climate
risk where it poses a financially material risk to pension funds.117
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In relation to investor action on climate change, the Oxford-
Martin Principles, discussed below, provide a clear approach for
investors to pursue climate-friendly activities. Pressure from
investors is useful to incentivize directors to take into account
climate change risks and consider and assess transitions to greener
and cleaner corporate decisions.118 What is missing is regulatory
requirements imposed on directors and their companies to limit
emissions in keeping with safe global temperature increases.
Converting initiatives, such as the Oxford-Martin Principles
into regulatory requirements, is likely to encounter considerable
resistance from the industry, although regulatory movements,
such as the Energy Transitions and Green Growth law in
France,119 do incentivize decarbonization by disclosure of indus-
try plans. As climate impacts increase, however, mandatory
disclosure and assessment rules concerning climate risk are likely
to become increasingly popular around the globe and may be
used as the first step along a decarbonization regulatory pathway.
To sum up, Section 172 CA 2006 was introduced, amongst
other reasons, to encourage a long-term perspective in the board-
rooms and the corporate decision-making process. It constituted a
step beyond the common law’s narrow focus on shareholder
interests, which were frequently viewed in a short-term manner.
Although it represents a positive development, it remains a mod-
est one and subtle in nature. Perhaps, in spite of the changes to
Section 172, a number of new finance and fiduciary initiatives are
forcing the issue of climate change and long-term thinking on to
board agendas. New regulatory initiatives and social movements
may also add market pressure to boardrooms regarding near-term
choices in themost emission-intensive companies such as coal and
oil companies. These recent changes and normative movements
can also put pressure on directors to consider the investment
choices and desires of their largest investors. Combined with
new governance initiatives, which are described below, new
temporal management perspectives could be adopted by directors.
5 NEW INITIATIVES: TCFD, THE ENTERPRISE
PRINCIPLES AND THE OXFORD-MARTIN
PRINCIPLES
In addition to new finance regulation and social movements,
a number of new governance initiatives have been developed
which encourage the assessment and disclosure of climate risk
for companies. This section assesses what these new govern-
ance initiatives require of companies, whether they address
temporal conflicts and are they industry specific (for example
do they provide ‘how to’ criteria to companies on how to
consider and address climate risk in the long term). While
temporal conflicts remain within company law between
short-term shareholder interests and long-term firm value,
increased shareholder activism, along with increased and
enhanced disclosure obligations on firms contained in these
new initiatives, may now be coalescing to require more and
better consideration of climate risks by directors.120 A number
of new initiatives are requiring large companies in particular
to assess, account for and disclose their vulnerability to the
impacts of climate change. These initiatives include the
TCFD, Principles of Enterprise Obligations, and the
Oxford-Martin Principles. A recent report to the
Environmental Audit Committee in the UK is also consider-
ing mandatory ways to ensure adequate and consistent dis-
closure by companies of climate risk. Accounting for climate
risk can highlight to Boards the benefits of a longer-term
approach to decision-making.
5.1 The TCFD Reports
The risks of transition to a low-carbon economy are so great that
if the re-pricing of assets occurs at an abrupt rate, it could
negatively impact financial stability.121 Mark Carney, the
Governor of the Bank of England, first raised the issue in 2015
in a landmark speech called ‘Breaking the Tragedy of the
Horizons – Climate Change and Financial Stability’122 where
he highlighted that asset valuation horizons were much longer
than the performance horizons currently employed by business,
and climate change could exacerbate these temporal differences
between long-term climate risks and short-term business, invest-
ment and political cycles. More recently, Mark Carney has also
highlighted the ‘success as failure’ climate paradox; that too rapid
a transition to alternative energy systems could ‘destabilise mar-
kets, spark a procyclical crystallisation of losses and lead to a
persistent tightening of financial conditions: a climate Minsky
moment.’123 The risk paradigm is therefore twofold: the risks of
not transitioning away from fossil fuels are greater in the longer
term, but the risks of too abrupt a transition can cause systemic
financial risks in the shorter term.124 Therefore, an aggressive yet
stable transition to a low-carbon economy is needed, and a
phased approach to achieving that trajectory could be a valuable
transition strategy.
The Financial Stability Board recommended to the G20
that an industry-led disclosure task force on climate change be
established to help investors assess transition plans and changes
in the value of assets, and to develop recommendations for
more effective climate-related disclosures.125 The aim of the
recommendations is to ensure that the effects of climate
change are routinely considered in business and investment
decisions, ultimately leading to smarter, more efficient alloca-
tion of global capital and smoothing of the transition to a
more sustainable, low-carbon economy.126 The inspiration
for the series of reports was the acknowledgement that most
businesses misunderstood the risk of climate change as solely a
long-term problem, but that in fact climate-related risks and
the expected transition to a low-carbon economy would
affect most economic sectors and industries.127 The most
significant risks of climate change were likely to emerge
over the medium and long term, but the uncertainty in the
timing and magnitude of impacts present challenges to
118 Lisa Benjamin, Institutional Investors in the UK and Carbon Major
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119 Law No. 2015-992, Act of 17 Aug. 2015.
120 Benjamin, supra n. 84, at 98. See also John Lowry, The Duty of Loyalty
of Company Directors: Bridging the Accountability Gap Through Efficient
Disclosure, 68(3) Cambridge L.J. 607 (2009); Keay, supra n. 106, at 29.
121 Carney, supra n. 16, at 6, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publica
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businesses in understanding the potential impacts on their
business, strategies and financial performance.128
A key gap in existing disclosure initiatives was that managers,
investors and decision-makers lacked information on the finan-
cial implications of climate-related aspects to an organization’s
business.129 Financial disclosures on climate change are often
boilerplate, non-comparable, and lack decision-useful content
for investment, insurance, and lending activities in the medium
to long term.130 This is problematic as the TCFD estimate that
climate-related impacts on business may be enormous – the
value of impacts on manageable assets could range from USD
4.2 trillion to USD 43 trillion between now and the end of the
century.131 These economic impacts could come from weaker
growth and lower asset returns, which means many businesses
may not be able to avoid economic impacts by simply shifting
assets to avoid climate risk.132 The report lays out the four major
categories of financial impact in a business due to climate change.
These are income statements (revenues being affected by
changes to demand and supply); expenditures (costs structures
and adaptation to impacts as well as capital expenditure for
resilience); balance sheets (asset valuations such as long-lived
assets and future investments being affected) and finally capital
and financing (for example increased debt to compensate for
reduced operating cash or new capital expenditures for research
and development).133
As a result of this fragmentation of disclosure initiatives, and
the scale of potential financial impacts, the FSB concluded that a
common reporting framework across the G20 disclosure regimes
was required. At a business level, the reports recommend that
investors and businesses consider their long-term strategies in
order to determine the most efficient allocation of capital, taking
into account climate risk. Challenges remain, however, as to the
best method for businesses to adopt in achieving this approach.
The TCFD acknowledges that the large-scale and long-term
nature of climate change makes it uniquely challenging in the
context of economic decision-making.134 As a result, the touch
points and time frames in which climate change may affect an
organization will vary.135 The report recommends businesses
start with a value chain assessment over reasonable time frames,
which relate to relevant transition and physical risks on the
operations and assets of a particular business, including an assess-
ment of potential opportunities.136 They recommend that busi-
nesses include disclosures on climate risk in their mainstream
financial filings to avoid separate disclosure obligations, and also
to enable the evolution of practices and techniques more rapidly
(including data analytics) to improve the quality of disclosures.137
The TCFD recommend four thematic areas of disclosure: gov-
ernance, strategy, risk management, metrics and targets.138 The
strategy-building element is the most relevant in terms of the
smoothing of temporal dissonances. It includes an assessment of
the actual and potential impacts of climate-related risk and
opportunities on the business strategy and financial planning of
an organization.
The report recommends that business strategy disclosures
describe what the relevant short-, medium- and long-term
time horizons are, taking into account the useful life of business
assets or infrastructure, and aligning those with climate-related
issues manifested over the medium to long-term.139 Specific
climate-related issues should be described for each time horizon
(short, medium and long) which could have a material financial
impact for the business.140 Risks and opportunities enumerated
by business-relevant sectors and geographies are also relevant, as
well as how climate-related issues could impact financial plan-
ning processes, time periods used, and how risks/opportunities
are prioritized by the business.141 These strategic influences
should reflect a holistic picture of the interdependencies of the
business and its ability to create value over time, and how
climate-related impacts may affect that.142 The process effec-
tively meshes value-creation timeframes with climate-related
time periods. Finally, the resilience of the strategy to taking
into account climate scenarios should also be addressed.143
The final tool the report recommends is the use of scenario
analysis. Scenarios are narratives which describe coherent
futures, and are useful for exploring key uncertainties.144
Scenarios can demonstrate pathways to that future and the
drivers of change along the pathway.145 Scenario analysis can
test the robustness of an organization’s strategy and financial
plans under different plausible future states.146 The tool is
particularly useful to assess circumstances with varied possible
outcomes which are highly uncertain, may evolve over the
medium to longer term, and which are potentially
disruptive.147 The analysis can help a business better frame
strategic issues and assess the possible range of management
and business-specific responses.148
In its technical supplement on the use of scenario analysis,
the TCFD promotes scenario analysis as a tool to enhance
plan flexibility or resiliency of businesses to a range of future
states to help understand how a business will perform in these
future states.149 The scenarios employed should be aggressive
and include a 2°C or lower temperature thresholds, but also
cover a reasonable variety of future outcomes, both favour-
able and unfavourable.150 Scenario testing is useful for some
climate risks and time frames, particularly transition risks
across periods, but the Center for Independent Climate
Research (CICERO) determines that the tool is not as useful
for physical risks.151 This is due to the fact that physical risks
such as flooding and extreme events are already occurring,
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and are independent of scenarios in the near future.152 They
recommend a period of stress testing which reflects the life-
time of assets under consideration, including how long that
asset is exposed to climate risks.153 CICERO also recom-
mends that businesses use a range of climate scenarios to
stress-test for transition impacts across all time periods.154
The TCFD Technical Supplement elaborates a process of
applying scenario analysis. Initially a business should ensure that
the right governance structure is in place to integrate scenario
analysis into its strategic policy.155 Businesses should then assess
the materiality of climate-related risks, identify and define a range
of scenarios, evaluate the business impacts including input costs,
operational costs, revenues and supply chains, business interrup-
tion as well as timing issues, identify potential responses and then
document and disclose the process, including key inputs, assump-
tions, analytical choices such as scenarios chosen, time horizons
and models used, outputs, as well as potential management
responses.156 This process should identify the potential effects on
the organization’s strategic and financial position under each
defined scenario, while identifying key sensitivities.157
The TCFD Guidance is therefore specifically addressed to
temporal dimensions. It is voluntary in nature and therefore
imposes no requirements on companies. Some of the guidance
being developed is industry specific, but does not yet provide a
‘how to’ kit providing companies with criteria with specific
time frames which measure against climate scenarios. It does,
however, provide a broad set of tools which companies can
begin to use in order to assess both climate risk and climate
opportunities for their business. Companies can use the TCFD
Guidance in order to describe specific climate-related issues for
broad time horizons (short, medium and long) which can be
developed by the companies.158 Scenario analysis is a new and
emerging field, and some of the data is only available at the
global or macro level, and therefore the requisite granularity of
data may not be available to all businesses.159 Implementing
scenario stress testing requires information that is tailored to
particular sectors as well as to particular corporate
characteristics.160 As a result, it is a tool mainly used by larger
business organizations at present, but more detailed scenario
guidance is anticipated to be published by the TCFD in the
near future. Currently the TCFD recommends that businesses
take a qualitative approach to scenario analysis building that
progresses and deepens over time.161 While the recommenda-
tions are voluntary in nature, they were informed by extensive
industry consultation and are likely to become industry stan-
dards. While the TCFD Guidance may not be ‘adoption ready’
for all companies, larger and progressive companies could both
use and implement their recommendations. As highlighted by
the UNEP FI, pilot projects of willing companies could pro-
vide useful lessons for what types of additional guidance and
criteria are needed. In addition to voluntary disclosure regimes,
legal obligations in this area are also emerging.
5.2 Principles on Climate Obligations of Enterprises
and the Oxford-Martin Principles
Consideration of climate change can no longer be treated as only
a voluntary and peripheral issue for boards. In 2018, a prominent
group of legal experts developed the Principles of Climate
Obligations of Enterprises. The Principles follow on from the
Oslo Global Principles which distilled general legal obligations
regarding climate change. The Enterprise Principles apply only
to private, commercial or industrial entities, or non-private
entities that carry on commercial or industrial activities. This
would include investors in some of their investment activities.
The inspiration behind the Principles is the enormous contribu-
tion that businesses make to climate change, and the realization
that it is impossible to achieve the required global emission
reductions without major contributions from enterprises.162
While the Principles are regarded as aspirational, and the authors
acknowledge they are progressive, they also consider that as the
threat of runaway climate change materializes, the law in this
area will likely progress rapidly in order to meet the urgent
demands of society.163
The Principles are wide ranging and include reduction
obligations of enterprises, as well as disclosure obligations.
They note that enterprises should take all reasonable steps to
reduce the emissions of their activities to the point where
they are no longer excessive, in the shortest time reasonably
feasible.164 It is acknowledged that specific steps, and conse-
quentially time frames, will vary according to the circum-
stances of the business. Disclosures must be proportionate to
the size of the enterprise and its location.165 The Principles do
give some guidance as to what should be considered material
in disclosures, describing materiality as a threshold for influ-
encing the economic decisions of stakeholders which use the
organization’s financial statements.166 Some obligations apply
specifically to investors to take into account the GHG emis-
sions of any potential investment project during and after
construction, as well as the borrower’s ability to repay in
light of the climate intensity of the project.167
Principle 18 specifies that short-sightedness must be
avoided.168 The Principles highlight the detrimental effect
short-termism has had on the long-term outcomes for
society,169 but also acknowledge that investors in particular
are under pressure to generate a return on investment in order
to cope with risk, inflation and long-term investment
returns.170 In this context, the Principles are innovative.
They advocate that, considering the magnitude of climate
risk, investors are not only allowed but may be obligated, to
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invest in funds that generate less profit in the near future if
and to the extent that this strategy would be the only way to
avoid temperature increases above 2°C. Whether this invest-
ment approach is adopted by businesses is unclear, but the
authors expect that the law will develop in this direction in
the next ten to twenty years.171
The Principles are voluntary and so do not require any action
from companies. However, the authors seek to distil legal prin-
ciples that avoid the existing temporal dissonance around invest-
ment horizons and climate risks. They acknowledge that while
the long-term temperature goals, or any provisions of the Paris
Agreement, do not apply specifically to companies, they con-
sider these temperature goals to be legally relevant as they are
likely to colour open norms of domestic and international law.-
172 As a result, they expect states, and domestic and international
law, to develop in that direction, and therefore the obligations of
enterprises should align in that direction as well.173 Therefore,
they make the legal argument that business time frames and
climate goals should be aligned. The Principles clearly do not
provide specific time frames for action – stating that taking all
reasonable steps in the shortest time reasonably feasible is purpo-
sefully vague.174 The Principles recognize that action is specific
and relative, highlighting that while coal plants should be the
first to be phased out, the poverty-reduction and energy needs of
least developed countries should also be considered.175 As a
result, companies themselves will have to assess how to imple-
ment the Principles and what the appropriate time frames are.
At the same time as the Principles emerged, the Oxford-
Martin Principles to Guide Investment Towards a Stable
Climate were published. Due to the shortcomings of scenario
analyses, they advocate that businesses commit to a tempera-
ture increase of 1.5°C or well below 2°C, a date before which
they will achieve net-zero emissions, and to create profitable
net-zero business models. The Principles also advocate that
businesses include quantitative mid-term targets.176 They
consider phased, interim targets as vital to the ability to
properly assess the compatibility of the business strategy with
the Paris long-term temperature goals.177 Again, while volun-
tary, the Oxford-Martin principles also recognize temporal
dissonance and in fact recommend a phased, target-based
approach. In contrast to the Enterprise Principles, the
Oxford-Martin Principles are short and concise, but again
rely on companies to adopt the most appropriate time frames
and levels of action. They do not provide ‘how to’ criteria
with specific guidance, but instead provide overarching prin-
ciples and approaches that can be adopted by companies.
6 INDUSTRY AND SECTOR-SPECIFIC
CONSIDERATIONS
Companies can both benefit from improved governance on
climate change, as well as spur on regulatory change by gov-
ernments. Action by companies on climate change can build
confidence in governments to adopt more and better climate
policy and more ambitious national goals.178 Companies can
act as ‘orchestrators’ by coordinating national governments on
climate policy implementation, aid with exchanges of knowl-
edge and good practices, and develop international cooperative
initiatives which are multi-country and multi-actor.179 As a
result, corporate action on climate change is both important
and can provide a catalytic effect for governance initiatives. At
the same time, companies themselves need more and better
targeted governance initiatives to aid them in smoothing the
temporal dissonance between climate change and short-term
profit making. The relationship between good corporate gov-
ernance and action on climate change is clear.
Action on climate change is now urgent and must take place
within the next decade, and beyond. These timescales are well
within the investment horizons of existing long-lived emitting
infrastructural assets,180 as well as management periods considered
by directors. Directors must consider a wide range of climate risks
and manage and report those risks. For large companies, this
consideration will often involve the direct integration of climate
risk into existing risk management and decision-making
processes.181 What information is considered material and dis-
closed, how it is disclosed and the temporal choices directors have
to make is still uncertain. What is clear is that it is now reasonable
for directors to take into account, at the very least, industry
guidance,182 which will certainly now include the TCFD recom-
mendations, and possibly the Enterprise Obligations and Oxford-
Martin Principles, discussed above. It is also clear that corporate
governance guidance as well as Section 172 of the Companies
Act 2006 provides sufficient flexibility for directors to both con-
sider and take action on the long-term goals of the companies.
New social norms and regulatory initiatives for institutional inves-
tors also provide directors with incentive to move away from
short-termism, although these initiatives have not yet become
mainstreamed in finance capital.
Integration time frames and other choices will be indus-
try and sector-specific depending on the vulnerability of
the business to climate risk and technological changes, and
the fossil fuel intensive nature of their business models. As a
result, business reactions to these initiatives are likely to
vary, according to sectors. Government regulations around
auto-emissions, for example, will affect that industry sooner
than other industries.183 The insurance industry has also
been an early mover and active on climate change due to
its higher financial exposure to climate-related extreme
events.184 Large industry players, such as the IKEA
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Group, Unilever, Tesco, General Mills, L’Oréal, Walmart
and McDonalds, have signed on to the voluntary Science-
Based Targets Initiative. The Initiative provides a formal
framework for measuring and tracking goals against the
Paris Agreement temperature goals.185 These large compa-
nies are planning emissions reductions along their supply
chains as well. Corporate activity among such large indus-
try actors demonstrates significant activity in the climate
arena. Fiscal incentives, such as subsidies for renewable
energy investments or carbon taxes, would further facilitate
corporate action. Industries with large carbon footprints
may need further incentives to act, despite high exposure
and the opportunity for voluntary action. The food and
beverage industry is a significant driver of climate change.
Agricultural production and associated emissions, combined
with deforestation and land use change, account for
approximately 25% of GHG emissions.186 The industry is
also highly vulnerable to climate-induced impacts, such as
drought and floods, causing crop failures and supply chain
disruptions. These companies need incentives to invest in
short-term emission reductions, even though these
may lead to long-term financial benefits. Conflicts and
trade-offs between environmental and economic goals do
and will persist for these industries.187 Fiscal incentives to
transition towards green energy as well as disincentives for
continuing to rely on fossil fuels are relevant to these
industries. Fiscal incentives, such as carbon taxes, innova-
tions in airline and shipping emissions, as well as changing
diet and consumption habits are also required, but may take
longer to implement and become effective. A wide array of
regulations and financial incentives may be needed, but
clarification that Section 172 allows directors to make
investments in long-term energy efficient vehicles, build-
ings and product choices would also be useful for directors.
There are a number of new governance initiatives, which are
available to companies and their directors to begin the smoothing
of temporal dissonance between short-term corporate time hor-
izons and the long-term impacts of climate change. As assessed
above, most of these initiatives currently only provide broad sets
of principles and guidance to directors, and do not yet provide the
requisite specificity and ‘how to’ toolkits for companies to assess
climate risk. The TCFD has come closest with its recommenda-
tions of scenario analysis. It is developing a set of industry-specific
guidance and is likely to develop further and more specific gui-
dance in the future. The outcomes of the UNEP FI pilot project
will also likely provide important lessons for international govern-
ance regimes on how to produce better guidance and criteria.
Companies will require this specific guidance in order to adopt a
phased approach to reducing the gap between long-term climate
goals and short-term business horizons. Further regulatory speci-
ficity is also required. The Climate Change Act 2008 imposes
national emission reduction targets, which are focused on the long
term.188 It is the responsibility of the government to implement
these targets, and to create plans for the industry to align their
emissions accordingly. This is done through interim carbon bud-
gets over five-yearly time periods, and the Act places an obligation
on the government to prepare policies to meet these budgets as
well as to produce a UK Climate Change Risk Assessment
Report every five years.189 While the Clean Growth Strategy is
primarily a tool to achieve these aims, specific policies on indus-
try-specific emission reductions are currently lacking.190 In addi-
tion to more industry-specific regulatory guidelines, addressing
climate change also means addressing corporate governance def-
icits. Existing corporate governance structures assume good risk
management schemes are already in place. The TCFD itself
recognizes that businesses must have the right governance struc-
ture in place in order to properly integrate scenario analysis into
their strategic planning.191 As a result, good corporate governance
is a prerequisite for both adoption and implementation of more
specific tools and guidance. The nexus between corporate gov-
ernance and action on climate change is therefore closely linked.
Where good corporate governance structures exist within
companies which pay proper attention to long-term interests,
these new climate governance initiatives will be considered as
broad, useful tools and principles which will assist directors in
navigating the complex arena of climate impacts, climate risks and
their financial implications. More specific tools are already being
developed. The Church of England Pensions Board and the
Environment Agency Pensions Fund are developing a free online
toolkit called ‘The Transition Pathway Initiative’ which analyses
fossil fuel and energy intensive companies’ plans to transition to
sustainable business models. The tools available certainly
have their gaps and inadequacies. There is a lack of robust and
cost-effective quantification tools of the potential impacts of
climate change risks and opportunities at the asset and project
level.192 There is also considerable variability of climate-related
impacts across and within sectors, and also a high degree of
uncertainty around the timing and magnitude of climate risks.193
Thismakes assessing disclosure risks and potential business-specific
impacts difficult. Businesses must also be careful in considering
linkages between scenario analyses and assessing the potential
impacts on cash flow and expenditures, as well as the resilience
of an organization’s strategy.194
A recent House of Commons Environmental Audit
Committee report looked specifically at the issue of short-termism
and its consequences in the context of climate change and other
environmental issues.195 Short-termism leads to a tendency to
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underinvest in physical assets, technical innovation and employ-
ees’ skills in preference for nearer term gains.196 Investment banks
and credit rating agencies also do not sufficiently incorporate
long-term considerations despite sustainability risks being ofmate-
rial importance for a company’s performance and credit
worthiness.197 The nature of stock exchanges themselves being
listed companies can incentivize increased trading volumes, and
investment consultants for pension funds have fee incentive struc-
tures that drive the short-term outlook which can influence
capital allocation.198 The report concludes that climate change
and other environmental problems pose financially material
threats to the economy, and the focus on short-term returns
often lead to the neglect of longer-term considerations such as
climate-related risks and opportunities.199 They recommend that
the government clarifies that pension schemes and company
directors have a fiduciary duty to protect long-term value and
should be considering environmental risks in the light of this
obligation.200 They also note the weakness of the voluntary
approach, thus recommending that reporting become mandatory
on a ‘comply or explain’ basis by 2022. They also recommend that
the government issues guidance making it clear that the
Companies Act 2006 already requires companies to disclose cli-
mate change risks, where they are financially material, and that the
FRC Corporate Governance Code and the UK Stewardship
Code as well as the FCA’s Listing Rules be likewise amended
to require climate-related financial disclosures on a ‘comply and
explain’ basis by 2022.201 They also recommend that the govern-
ment works with the Committee on Climate Change to deter-
mine appropriate baseline policies and climate change scenarios
that can be used off-the-shelf as reference scenarios by companies
and asset owners.202 The relationship between long-term corpo-
rate governance and climate change is now aligning even more
closely in regulation.
7 CONCLUSION
Climate change and other sustainability issues are predominantly about
future consequences. We do know that business as usual will jeopardize
nature, human life, the economy and by the same token investments.
Hence, a short-term perspective is no longer acceptable.203
We are experiencing the impacts of climate change now,
and the impacts are anticipated to become more severe
and pervasive over time. Short-term operational and
financial planning cycles of 1–2 years and 2–5 years
respectively are still too short to incorporate climate
risks, which may have implications over longer periods
of time.204 The TCFD purposefully did not define rele-
vant time frames as these will vary across organizations,205
and wanted to encourage businesses to decide how to
define their own climate-business relevant time frames.
As a result, there may not be at present a natural ‘fit’
between business and climate time frames, and an exten-
sion of business time frames may have to be made. Some
of these activities may include what directors consider
‘crystal ball’ examinations, but risk management strategies
are designed to accommodate levels of uncertainty.
In terms of future action and recommendations for better
environmental governance initiatives, further and better
guidance, as well as easily accessible scenarios should be
made available to companies in order to enable a business
to identify and assess business-specific climate risks and
incorporate these risks into existing risk management pro-
cesses, as well as elaborate their potential financial implica-
tions for stakeholders. Exchanging of experiences and
expertise within sectors is likely to facilitate the adoption
of successful reporting and management models as well.
Pilot projects such as the UNEP FI project adopting the
TCFD recommendations is a good start. In addition, the
nexus between long-term corporate governance and the
short, medium and long-term impacts of climate change
should be highlighted for directors. Companies require
existing and robust corporate governance structures which
both consider and reward long-term management in order
for new climate governance initiatives to be successfully
implemented. Corporate boards must learn to develop,
report and implement a type of ‘climate solvency’ where
positive long-term contributions to a community’s climate
balance sheet is developed, including a margin for risk.206
Better and more accurate information about climate risk
using tools such as scenario analysis can help to smooth the
temporal dissonance between climate change and corporate
short-termism and aid in the global transition away from fossil
fuels towards a safer climate future. Specific tools can provide
a roadmap to directors to adopt a phased approach to redu-
cing emissions, the risk of climate change to their business, as
well as highlight climate opportunities. Whether this phased
approach will spur a transition that is timely enough to avoid
catastrophic climate change is questionable, and the answer
still remains unclear.207
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